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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
C&Y CORP., a Utah corporation,
ROBERT A. CONDIE, an
individual, and JAMES YARTER,
an individual,

:
i
:
:

Plaintiff/Appellants•

:

vs.

:

GENERAL BIOMETRICS, INC., a
Delaware corporation;
VENTANA GROWTH FUND, a
California limited partnership, and THOMAS GEPHART,
an individual,

J:
::
:
:
j
j

Defendant/Appellees.

Court of Appeals
No. 940340-CA

:

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS AND RESPONSE TO
CROSS-APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Although this is Appellants C&Y Corporation's, Robert A.
Condie's and James Yarter's ("C&Y Corporation") Reply Brief, C&Y
Corporation is entitled to restate the issues presented for review
by the cross-appellants.
1.

Are the trial court's findings of fact that neither

Robert A. Condie nor James Yarter took any actions which breached
their

fiduciary

erroneous?

duties

to

General

Biometrics,

Inc.

clearly

Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly

erroneous and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
Corp. v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320, 321 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

1

Southland

STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 33, provides in
pertinent part:
Except in a first appeal of right in a
criminal case, if the court determines that a
motion made or appeal taken under these rules
is either frivolous or for delay, it shall
award just damages, which may include single
or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing
party. The court may order that the damages
be paid by the party or by the partyf s
attorney.
Utah R. App. Pro. 33(a).
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

40, provides in

pertinent part:
The signature of an attorney or a party
constitutes a certificate that the attorney or
the party has read the motion, brief, or other
paper; that to the best of the attorney's or
party's knowledge, information, and belief,
formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing
law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law; and that it is not interposed for any
improper purposes, such as to harass or cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the
cost of litigation.
Utah R. App. Pro. 40(a).
The remainder of Rules 33 and 40, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure are set forth in Exhibit A attached hereto.
ARGUMENT
I.
C&Y CORPORATION IS NOT REQUIRED
TO MARTIAL THE EVIDENCE.
The essence of General Biometrics', Thomas Gephart's and
Ventana's

(hereinafter

collectively

referred

to

as

"General

Biometrics") briefs is that C&Y Corporation's appeal should be
2

dismissed

for failing to martial the evidence.

However, C&Y

Corporation is not required to martial the evidence in support of
the trial court's finding of fact on whether the parties entered a
contract because C&Y Corporation is not challenging the findings of
fact.
entered

C&Y Corporation is not asserting here that the trial court
erroneous

findings of fact.

What C&Y Corporation is

challenging is the trial court's legal determination that the
contract was not sufficiently definite because a meeting of the
minds as to certain ancillary terms is required in order to have a
binding agreement.

Because C&Y Corporation is not challenging the

trial court's findings of fact, there is no need to martial the
evidence in support of those findings.
As this Court is well aware, the well-settled law in this
state does not require that the parties have a meeting of the minds
as to ancillary incidental matters.
548 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d

A contract is not required to provide

for every collateral matter or possible contingency.

Nixon &

Nixon, Inc. v. John New & Assoc, Inc., 641 P.2d 144 (Utah 1982).
Moreover, the interpretation of a writing or writings is a question
of law.

See Equitable Life and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d

1187 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

Accordingly, because the trial court's

findings of fact are not being challenged, the martialling of the
evidence in support of those findings is not necessary.
II.
THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS
SUFFICIENTLY DEFINITE TO CONSTITUTE A CONTRACT.
The
Biometrics

is

agreement

between

sufficiently

C&Y

definite

3

Corporation
to

and

constitute

a

General
binding

contract because the parties agreed to the essential terms.* The
January 7th and 10th letters contain the sales price, the terms of
payment and what was to be sold. The purchase price was $500,000,
with $400,000 to be paid upon closing, $75,000 within 90 days and
$25,000 within 120 days.

The item to be purchased was the MRC

Division located in Bountiful, Utah, which included both the assets
and liabilities of that division.

The law is clear that courts

favor the determination that an agreement is sufficiently definite.
Application of Sing Chong Company, Ltd., 617 P.2d 578 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1980).2
Despite General Biometrics1 assertion that there was no
meeting of the minds as to what was to be purchased and sold, there
is no real question that it contained the assets and liabilities.
Just because one party asserts that certain terms are ambiguous

1

General Biometrics points out well one thing in its brief.
That one thing is that if the Court does not find that there is a
sufficiently definite contract, then the inquiry stops there and
this Court need not go any further. If there is no contract, then
issues of authority to enter the contract, what constitutes a cash
offer, etc., become moot. In a similar vein, the Court does not
need to address both of the issues of whether C&Y Corporation's
offer was a cash offer and whether Gephart had the apparent
authority to enter the contract. If the Court concludes that C&Y
Corporation made a cash offer of $500,000, then the offer would
fall under the Board of Director's prior approval. Conversely, if
the Court concludes that Gephart had the apparent authority to bind
General Biometrics to the purchase and sale of the MRC Division,
then the issue of whether the offer was a cash offer is irrelevant.
2

In spite of General Biometrics' contention to the contrary,
the rule set forth in Application of Sing Chong does not mean that
the rule does not come into play until after the courts find that
an agreement is reached. It means that in determining whether an
agreement is reached, the courts will favor the determination
that
the agreement was reached. However, General Biometrics1 reading of
this Rule would nullify the effect of this rule of construction.
Basically, General Biometrics1 reading is that if a contract is
definite, then the courts favor a determination that it is
definite. That simply does not make sense.
4

does not mean that those terms are ambiguous.

Equitable Life &

Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah Ct. App.
1993).

Although Mr. Condie's January 7th letter states only

"assets," that is a term of art in the industry which means an
asset

purchase.

In an

asset

purchase,

both

the

assets

and

liabilities are purchased, as opposed to a stock purchase wherein
stock

is purchased.

Mr. Brough, who was an expert witness,

testified as follows:
Q
From an accountant's point of view,
is sale of assets different than the sale of
assets and liabilities?
A

No.

Q

It's not any different?

A

Not in my judgment, no.

Q
Do accountants distinguish from
assets and liabilities on balance sheets?
A

Yes.

Q
And yet you consider assets and
liabilities to be fungible terms.
Is that
correct?
A
I think what we're getting confused
with a generic term of ways businesses are
bought out. I'll tell you honestly the way
this looks to me, when accountants talk about
different ways.
* * *

Q
That's my next — I believe you are
referring to the difference about assets and
liabilities.
A

Yes.

Q

And what is that?

5

A
Well,
accountants
and
business
people in general talk about two ways to buy
companies. One is a stock purchase and the
other is asset purchase. And it's very common
for people to say/ is this a stock or asset
purchase.
And
1
think
that
reading
Mr. Condie's letter and also that really the
first time it's talking about in a general
sense, we're making an asset purchase here.
And it's common in asset purchases for
liabilities to kind of attach and come with
them as opposed to say a stock purchase where
you are buying different assets which is the
underlying stock of a company. That's not the
indication here. 1 think we're talking about
a kind of generic reference to asset purchase
here and certainly there is a difference
between assets and liability.
But 1 don't
want to get it confused with what I think that
letter says.
Trial Transcript,

June 4, 1994, pp. 150 and

164-65

(emphasis

added)•
In addition, Mr. Gephart sent the January 10th letter,
which stated

"assets and liabilities," to Mr. Condie after a

telephone conversation in response to Mr. Condie's January 7th
letter.

During that telephone conversation, there is no question

that what was being purchased was the assets and liabilities of the
MRC Division.
than

a

Mr. Gephart's January 10th letter is nothing more

confirmation

of

that

telephone

confirmation of their agreement.

conversation

and

a

Mr. Condie testified as follows:

Q
(BY MR. MOXLEY):
I would like to
refer you to that letter, and in particular
the
first
paragraph.
What
was
your
understanding of his response to your offer?
A

Well, should I read it?

Q

Yes.

A
"Pursuant
to
your
January
7
correspondence and our telephone conversation
yesterday afternoon, I would like to provide a
written acknowledgement of the agreement
regarding the sales of assets and liabilities

6

of M R C from GenBio for $500,000.
As I
mentioned,, we generally agree with your proposal."
Q
what w a s y Q u r understanding of the
statement "we generally agree with your
proposal"?
A.
well, it's obvious that w e generally
agree. However, the second paragraph states
that I had an error and he says, please note,
however, and he corrected what w e had
corrected on the phone. And I'll just read
it.
"Section b , section c and section d of
your proposal only it seems to m e $450,000.
In this regard I would like to modify section
b to b e increased to $400,000 instead of
$350,000 which is what we had discussed the
prior day. So that the total will add up to
the entire $500,000.
I plan to take this
proposal to the General Biometrics board of
directors withiii the next week to receive
formal approval."
Q
j ^ ^ y Q U h a v e a n y d i S C U S S i o n with Mr.
Gephart about this letter after you received
• it?

A

No,

id not.

Q
And what
to the transaction';
A
in our second conversation where w e
talked and had an agreement on the price,
Mr. Gephart
asked m e if I would have the
legal work done because Mr. Flodin w a s busy
and they were anxious to close the deal. And
it would go much faster if w e had our
attorneys d o the documentation of the deal.
He also indicated that I should from that time
forward deal with Mr. Flodin, who I knew.
Trial Transcript, Jn ine 3 , 11 99 i, pp 104-05 (emphasis a d d e d ) .
Mr. Yarter testified bhat what "was being purchased was
=i si lee I: coi i ta
ai id liabilities.
Exhibit "B").

assets

See, e.g., Trial Exhibit 1 4 (a ttached hereto as

Mr. Yarter testified as follows:

A
Well, basically, this is a total
separate balance sheet from the total company.
7

It's just for the MRC division. And the sales
or p and 1 statement is a p and 1 statement
that just states the sales of the MRC
division. It doesn't state the sales of the
I-dot or the GenBio part of it. So these are
all p and 1 statements in the balance sheet
total which relate to MRC division.
Q
And by examining exhibits 13 and 14,
can you ascertain what assets and liabilities
are associated with the MRC division as
opposed to General Biometrics?
A

Yes.

Trial Transcript, June 2, 1993, p. 86 (emphasis added).
Mr. Gephartfs January 10th letter did not provide any
modification of the agreement, simply a correction in Mr. Condie's
addition.

The

correction

was

agreed

to

in

conversation between Mr. Condie and Mr. Gephart.

the

telephone

Mr. Gephart's

January 10th letter is the final word as to the sales price, terms
of payment and what was to be purchased.

Those are the essential

terms of the agreement.

Both Mr. Condie and Mr. Yarter agreed to

those essential terms.

Mr. Gephart agreed to those essential

terms.

There is absolutely no dispute as to the sales price, the

terms of payment or what was to be purchased.
Furthermore, because the Court ruled on a Rule 41 motion
at

the

end

of

C&Y

Corporation's

case,

any

testimony

from

Mr. Gephart on the issue of what was meant by "assets" is not to be
considered.

But

even

if

Mr.

Gephart's

testimony

is

to

be

considered, the trial court expressly found that it had "serious
reservations
Ruling

on

on

the

Proposed

credibility
Findings

and

of

Mr. Gephart's

Objections,

IF 9

testimony."
(R.

1593).

Mr. Gephart's testimony, therefore, would be of minimal assistance.

8

The requirement of board approval also does not offend
11ll i

IJIIPI Ill n i 11; iit'!"'>'

nil

II Hi i

I ' v i ni'i

Il

approval was

I Hi i"

agreement.

precondition to the formation
testifier

nil jr nt-Miicnl

hoc m i s i

At best,

contract

matter because the l i.

iinrd

a

as Mr. Condie

uuaiu approval was nothing more thar

told them

Ill

perfunctory

nateve

t

Trial

00-02.

Moreover, because of the

«r*i approval

November 1989, of

*

s

knew that additional board approva ] \ >« as :i: 10 1: necessary • The Board
already had pre-approved the sale of the MRC Division for $500,000
<

).

As set forth *« r c v Corporationf<= tyrincipa^ Briet, this
case is strikingly simila

«

* Rand-Whitney Packaging

Cor p. _y , Robertson Grou^t _v«

'

1986).

But this case is very df>"'

southland loxp

P.2d 320 (Utah Ct

"he Southland Corp. case, the

App

ru L t ei:

> 60

letter agreements between the r^r+jps m^ie

^^ ,*t-p y -o mention of

1 I HI

I I 111 II

I II 1,11 lll'j t I " I

I II I

I II II II

II ( i m t t l l i t ?l 1 L

I

l l ' l j l f i ll I

I (ill,

even mentioned for the undefined rights claimed by Southland
the court found,
'.

|, I:]he documents and the testimony demonstrate
e.iTt",

eiiii=!!iti S o u t h l a n d c l a i m s .

The minds of the parties did not meet

thliii property interest. .

! I ::: • purchase price is mentioned for the undefined rights. The
language is vague, inconsistent, ambiguous, and incomplete."
<

Id.

•

In the present case, the language of the contract is not
vague or ambiguous. The price is mentioned, the terms of the sale
9

are mentioned, and the item to be purchased is mentioned.

The

situation in Southland Corp, is very different from the present
case.

Despite General Biometrics1 hopeful imagination, there is

absolutely no similarity between the present case and the Southland
Corp. case.
But the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law
that a meeting of the minds on certain ancillary terms was
necessary in order for there to be a binding agreement.

Even if

there was no meeting of the minds on these ancillary items such as
employee benefits, non-competition provision, etc., that is not
required in order to have a binding contract. That is not the law
in Utah.

The well-settled law in this state is that if an

agreement is reached on the essential terms, a binding, enforceable
contract is created, despite the existence of ancillary incidental
matters that are not specifically addressed or concluded in the
agreement.

Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

A contract is not required to provide for every collateral matter
or possible contingency. Nixon & Nixon, Inc. v. John New & Assoc,
Inc., 641 P.2d 144 (Utah 1982).
In the present case, the essential terms of the agreement
are the purchase price, the terms of payment and what is being
sold.

All of those terms were agreed to by the parties, as

evidenced by the January 7th and January 10th letters. Items such
as the noncompetition provision, employee benefits, etc. are not
essential terms of the agreement. Those items were not the primary
object of the agreement. Accordingly, because the essential terms
of the., agreement were agreed to by the parties, the trial court
erred

in ruling

that there was no agreement.
10

This Court,

therefore, should reverse the trial court and rule that there was
a

sufficiently

definite

contract

-w^ii the parties

for

the

1
III.
THE SUBJECT CONTRACT FALLS WITHIN THE GENERAL BIOMETRICS
BOARD'S PRIOR APPROVAL BECAUSE IT IS ft CASH OFFER.
C&Y Corporation's offer of $500,000 cash to purchase the
MRC

0 0 00

cash

pal d

upon

remaining $100, OOu

w. 1 1:1: :i i n L-'il Il '

closing

and

iaiJLb h lUlhii

the

il IIIIU

.

Biometrics Board's prior approval because i t constituted
offer

However, the

ial court

, holding that this was
H I I llHI

* ><

side, the Court shoult
of ld.>

orporatio. .«

u^e aa=> <* matter

i
• :«.

constituted a

I
ruling.

supports

The testimon

*

_,

another company, because

immunodot produc t

General Biometrics.

(R.1596)

than

not

approval

;

lid in the

Nowhere In the record is there any
$100,000

did

^h

i; i I: i ::l cl: i

testimony that a hold back

otherwise

n i ^ e t exchange with

needed the influx ~*

development of

this

.o*Ksrui Biometrics wanted

cash, and not stock in another company n

cash

cash offer."

the purchase price for

within

the

prior

board

testimony was that the board approved the sale
c: $500,000 in

.Ill

Illifit is exactly what C&Y

Corporation offered and what General Biometrics accepted.

T'llhp,

holding back of $100,000 for a total of 120 days does not alter the
natur

i

,

C&.Y Corporation was offering cash.

, 1

The trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that
C&Y Corporation's offer was not a cash offer. Therefore, the Court
should reverse the trial court and rule that C&Y Corporation made
a cash offer which fell within the board of director's prior
approval.
IV.
GEPHART HAD THE APPARENT AUTHORITY TO BIND GENERAL
BIOMETRICS TO THE PURCHASE AND SALE OF THE MRC DIVISION.
Based upon the findings of fact entered by the trial
court, the trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that
Gephart did

not have the apparent

authority

to bind

General

Biometrics to the purchase and sale of the MRC Division.

Even

though certain actions may ultimately have been approved by the
board of directors, it was not done until after Mr. Gephart or
Mr. Townsen

had

given

their

approval

to

the

transaction

and

permitted the board to approve such action. The board of directors
simply would rubber stamp Mr. Gephartfs decisions. That is true in
regard to the transfer of funds to the Darox Corporation, financing
obtained from the Swedish investors and the firing of Mr. Monson,
who was General Biometrics1

President.

See Trial Transcript,

June 2, 1994, pp. 117-18, 140 and 242.
General

Biometrics

acquiesced

in, and

even

invited,

Mr. Gephart's and Mr. Townsen's control of its corporate affairs.
As

the trial court

specifically

found, both Mr. Gephart

and

Mr. Townsen had a great deal of control in the corporate decisions
affecting General Biometrics.

(R.1593).

Those findings of fact

are set forth on pages 19 through 21 of C&Y Corporation's opening
Brief.

If General Biometrics did not acquiesce in or invite
12

Mr. Gephart's and Mr. Il" , -jftn's control , II could *
these

persons

from

treating

MI

Townsen

(R.1593).

Biometrics

their

J,

corporation
and

General

prevented

:

from

When Mr.

own

acting

and

appointi; _,

*-*• directors.

dy was ^'^ed as president of the company,

Genera

Gephart,'

rather than M r .
(R.1593).

w

f General Biometrics.

General Biometrics

directors also could

h

senior

instead chose

acquiesce

regarding

payments.

but

iepharr'
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officers,

directors also could have made
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directors acquiesced in Mr. Gephart making these decisions in the
best interest

Ventana, Gephart's venture capital firm, rather

t

"

a classic situatioi

apparent authority

s

corporation

has acquiesced in and even invited the authority and control of
c

In addition, Mr. Condie and M r . Yarter did act in good
faith

and

reasonably

relied

authority.

In rulin

-

misrepresei i

upon

Mr.

Corpora-

.

Gephart's

assertion

i • rial in of
•

if li (ill I ,<

of

negligent
t

Mr. C o n d i e f s reliance on Mr, Gephart's assertion of control over
General Biometrics and his authority to bind General Biometrics to
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the subject contract was reasonable.3

The Court ruled as follows:

As
to
the
negligent
misrepresentation
standard, the plaintiffs have cited to the
Court Jardine versus Brunswick Corporation,
423 P. 2d 659, 1967.
It establishes a
standard.
It says, "where one having
pecuniary interest in a transaction is in a
superior position to know facts and carelessly
or negligently makes a false representation
concerning them expecting the other party to
rely on and act on, and the other party
reasonably does so and suffers a loss in that
transaction, the representor can be held
responsible if the other elements of fraud are
also present." . . . Based on the evidence,
and I think there is not a great deal of
evidence in this area as to the negligent
misrepresentation,
I think it is based
primarily on Mr. Condie's testimony as to the
representations of Mr. Gephart.
But the
evidence does establish that there was a
representation
that Mr. Gephart
had
the
authority to sell GenBio.
That the board
approval
would
be—there
would
be
no
difficulty in obtaining board approval. Then
the evidence does establish at this point that
Mr. Condie relied on that representation in
going forward and in the preparation of
documents. Mr. Yarter also testified that he
relied on it in liquidating approximately
$200,000 worth of assets in providing legal
fees for the sale of the corporation. Based
on that and based on the evidence that is
currently before the Court, the Court finds
that there has been a prima facie case
established as to negligent misrepresentation,
and therefore, would deny the Rule 41(b)
Motion as to that claim.
Trial Transcript, June 9th, pp. 18-19 (emphasis added).
General Biometrics conveniently ignores this express finding by the
trial court.

The reason the trial court found that Mr. Condie and

Mr. Yarter reasonably relied upon Mr. Gephart's representations was
because they had witnessed first-hand the exercise and control
3

The trial court ruled in favor of Defendants on C&Y
Corporation's claim of negligent misrepresentation because it found
that Mr. Gephart's representation was not of a presently existing
fact.
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Gephart exerted ove:
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\s former directors of General Biometrics, both Mr. Condie
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Gephart
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V.
THE TRIAL

COURTfS FINDINGS OF ti

ARE FATALLY INCONSISTENT.
As
trial court'

finding.*

t

i

ratai.y

;;consistent and must be

set aside by this Cour
contrary
Biometricsf

estopped from

blatant misrepresentation o f
citation

misrepresented

record

record

General

quotation is misquoted,
c 01 context.

The statement

quoted by General Biometrics that the

proposed findings had "nothing to do with Plaintiffs' alter-ego
argument" has absolutely nothing to do with the findings of fact on
apparent authority.
proposed
General

This statement was made in regard to only one

finding of fact, not all of the findings of fact as
Biometrics

states.

In

addition,

synonymous with apparent authority.

"alter-ego"

is not

What "alter-ego" refers to is

an entirely separate cause of action asserted in C&Y Corporation's
Complaint.

(R. 11-13)
In General Biometrics' Objections to C&Y Corporation's

Proposed

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions

of

Law,

General

Biometrics objected to C&Y Corporation's proposed Finding of Fact
No. 4 as follows:
Fact No. 4 is not relevant to the issue of
whether Yarter and Condie breached their
fiduciary duty to GenBio especially in light
of the court's ruling that there is no unity
of interest or authority of control between
Ventana and GenBio.
Fact No. 4 only has
relevance to Plaintiffs' alter-ego argument on
which this Court specifically declined to
rule.
See Transcript of Court's Ruling of
June 9, 1993, at 19.
(R. 1406) (emphasis added).

In response to that objection, C&Y

Corporation stated that "Proposed Finding of Fact No. 4 had nothing
to do with Plaintiffs' alter-ego argument . . . ."

(R. 1532).

There is absolutely no mention of apparent authority anywhere in
General Biometrics' objection or in C&Y Corporation's response to
that

objection.

As

referenced

by General

Biometrics

in

its

objection to the proposed finding of fact to the Court's Ruling of
June 9, 1993, the Court refrained from ruling on the alter-ego
cause of action holding that the issue had become moot in this case
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because

-ound

ttiat there was

J

underlying contract.

See

Transci: :i p I: pp
General Biometrics has misrepresented

^ this Court that

the statement made in relation to the entirely separate alter ego
claim has any bearing on the lusue of apparent authority.

Alter

y luvi" .ibsuJ till* I y 1111 IMI.II I oiiMlvi f

ego'an i, I apparent

In I his

setting. Accordingly, because of the complete inconsistency in the
trial court's findings of fact, this Court should remand this case
fnii
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apparent authority
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I I 11I l U e p l i r t i t

I in 1
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oind General Biometrics to the purchase and

sale of the MRC Division.
VI.
NEITHER MR. CONDIE NOR MR. YARTER BREACHED
THEIR FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO GENERAL BIOMETRICS.
Although Genex a ] Biome tr i cs 1 las accused C& iill! Cor p ::)i: a I:::i c n
of reneging on its duty to martial the evidence, General Biometrics
has done the very same thing J n challenging T'^e trial court's
i

1

their fiduciary duties owed

siti: breached

t General Biometrics.

The difference

between C&Y Corporation's appeal and General Biometrics' appeal is
1

irt made errors

of lav

General Biometrics

findings 1 1 ." :

challenging

trial court's

Ls a classic case of the pot calling the

kettle black.
The 1 t n i l mi Mill I 1' i 1 "i I s p i n j tut,
Mr.

Condie

n o r Mi:

General Biometrics.
Hi

Van lei

Yarter

breached

t 1 m l i iiii |»i,
their

t (<it:t
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I halt
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neither
to

T h e C o u r t e x p r e s s l y found that M r . C o n d i e and
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benefits on General Biometrics.

The Court made the following

findings of fact:
13. Although Mr. Condie was a director when
he first contacted Mr. Townsen to make an
offer to purchase the MRC Division, Mr. Condie
specifically resigned from the board so that
he could enter subsequent negotiations for
purchase and sale of the MRC Division and
consummate an agreement.
14. Mr. Yarter resigned from the board prior
to the time any offers for the purchase and
sale of the MRC Division were made.
15. Even after resigning from the board of
directors in November
1990, Mr. Yarter
introduced Dr. Preston Dorsett to GenBio for
the purpose of Dr. Dorsett negotiating for the
purchase and sale of the MRC Division.
16. When Mr. Condie rented his condominium in
Park City, Utah, to GenBio, there was a
benefit to the corporation rather than an
abuse of corporate authority. Three people
were
occupying
the
condominium
for
approximately $125 per week.
17. The receipt by Mr. Condie of health
insurance provided by GenBio was not an abuse
of discretion and did not constitute an
improper benefit. It appeared to be a custom
and practice of this corporation to provide
such benefits.
18. Mr. Condie as a director regularly
requested that shareholder meetings be held as
required by the Bylaws.
19. Other benefits also were provided to
Board members, the Board Minutes of November
30, 1989, show that the Board took action to
provide Ventana a $2,000 per month consulting
fee for prior service for approximately 8-15
months based on the fact that Mr. Townsen had
put in excess time prior to that period.
20. The information Mr. Condie or Mr. Yarter
obtained in making their decision to pursue
the purchase of the MRC Division was not of a
confidential
nature
and was
the same
information which had been sent to other
potential purchasers. The information which
Mr. Condie of [sic] Mr. Yarter received also
18

was-the same information sent to Dr. Dorsett.
21. Prior to the time Mr. Condie and
Mr. Yarter had any interest in purchasing the
MRC Division/ the GenBio Board of Directors
authorized the sale for $500,000 cash in
November 1989.
22. Information relating to the MRC Division,
including
financial
information,
was
segregated
for the express purpose of
providing this information to prospective
purchasers.
23. In the November 30, 1989, board meeting,
the Board of Directors gave Mr. Gordy approval
to sell MRC for $500,000 or more and Mr. Gordy
would receive a 5% commission for the sale of
the MRC Division. Mr. Gephart and Mr. Townsen
also gave their approval to sell the MRC
Division prior to the November 30, 1989,
meeting.
24. Mr. Gordyfs testimony indicated that In
regularly marketed the sale of MRC for a 6 to
8 month period.

34. The MRC Division clearly was for sale
beginning in November of 1989. Prior approval
of that sale also had been obtained from both
Mr. Gephart and Mr. Townsen prior to it going
to the Board of Directors for approval.
35. The business opportunity and information
regarding the potential of MRC had been
available to GenBio and its officers, and
particularly in this case, had been available
to Mr. Gephart and Mr. Townsen. Mr. Gephart
and Mr. Townsen had available to them the
same knowledge and information that was available to Mr. Condie and Mr. Yarter,
36. Every six months, Mr. Gephart and Mr.
Townsen performed a full evaluation of each of
the business opportunities of the portfolio
companies, including GenBio.
37. The same information also was fully
disclosed to Mr. Gephart and Mr. Townsen on at
least a bi-monthly basis.
I !:/( i ] Lna on Prooosec

.ndinas ar Il 11 11. >«-1 m i n i
in

III! Il I .1 "-I ijn ill

"I'll I "

(R. 1594-97) (emphasis added).
If General Biometrics wanted to challenge the sufficiency
of these findings, then it must martial the evidence in support of
these findings and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally
insufficient to support the findings. In Peterson v. Peterson, 818
P.2d 1305 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), this Court held:
We set aside findings of fact only when they
are clearly erroneous.
In making that
determination, we give "due regard" to the
"opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses." Utah R. Civ.
P. 52(a). The finding is clearly erroneous
when, "although there is evidence to support
it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence
is left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed." State v.
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987) (quoting
United States v. United States Gypsum Company,
333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
In challenging
findings, the appellant "must martial all
evidence in favor of the facts as found by the
trial court and then demonstrate that even
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable
to the court below, the evidence is
insufficient to support the findings of fact.
If the appellant fails to martial the
evidence, the appellate court assumes that the
record supports the accuracy of the lower
courtf s conclusions of law and application of
that law in the case."
Id. at 1307-08 (quoting Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah
1991)) (citations omitted). Because General Biometrics has failed
to martial the evidence and then demonstrate that the evidence is
legally insufficient to support the findings, they have failed to
meet their burden of showing that the findings of fact are clearly
erroneous. Accordingly,

this Court must deny General Biometries'

claim for relief. Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993).
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farter breached their fiduciary duties.

Even

though Mr. Condie and Mr. Yarter may have conceived of their plan
to purchase the MRC Division while they were still directors, there
is nothing improper about that.

As tl le Court specifically found,

the MRC Division clearly was for sale prior to the time Mr. Condie
and Mr. Yarter decided

inquire into purchasing the MRC Division

(

lull

d i n,ji(d,i„Ji \-.

Ill
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Bin > m e l r . u ; s ,

including Mr. Gephart and Mr Townsen, were very much aware of all
opportunities which were available to General Biometrics in regards
t

ex

obtained any confidential information regarding the MRC Division.
(R.1595).

Moreover, the Court specifically found that as soon as

Mr. Condie made an offer to purchase the MRC Division to a
disinterested person, he resigned from the Board of Directors so as
to avoid any potential conflict of interest.

(R.1594). Mr. Yarter

previously had resigned from the Board of Directors prior to making
the ottei
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offer

purchase the MRC Division, both Mr. Gephart and Mr.

Townsen knew very well who was attempting the purchase.
knew

thiii t

Biometrics
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has failed
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martial
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They both
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the evidence
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1

and has made

absolutely no showing that either Mr. Condie or Mr. Yarter breached
any of ttleli fiduciary duties to General Biometrics.
In addd t::i or i,

Gex iera] Biometrics is incorrect

assertion that the trial court

in its

found there was no breach of

fiduciary duty because the contract never was consummated.
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The

comment made by the Judge Memmott that there has been no harm to
General Biometrics because Mr. Condie's and Mr. Yarter's attempt to
purchase the MRC Division was unsuccessful merely was made in
passing.

The trial court did not in any manner rely on this

supposed conclusion of law in making its ruling that neither
Mr. Condie nor Mr. Yarter breached their fiduciary duties.

In the

trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law regarding
General Biometrics1 claim that Mr. Condie and Mr. Yarter breached
their

fiduciary duties, absolutely no statement

is made that

because the deal was not ultimately consummated, there could not
have been any breach of fiduciary duties.
made another misrepresentation

General Biometrics has

to this Court.

When read

in

context, that statement by Judge Memmott merely was meant to
suggest that General Biometrics likely suffered no damages, even
assuming a breach of fiduciary duty, because the contract never was
performed.

Again, the Court should not condone such conduct by

General Biometries' counsel and should affirm the trial court's
finding that neither Mr. Condie nor Mr. Yarter breached any of
their fiduciary duties to General Biometrics.
VII.
GENERAL BIOMETRICS IS NOT ENTITLED TO ITS COSTS AND
ATTORNEYS FEES INCURRED AS A RESULT OF DEFENDING THIS APPEAL.
General Biometrics is not entitled to its costs and
attorneys

fees incurred

Rule 33,

Utah

Rules

in defending
of

Appellate

this Appeal pursuant to
Procedure,

because

C&Y

Corporation's Appeal has a reasonable legal and factual basis.
Although Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides for
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an award of attorney fees, such an award is permitted only if the
appeal has
In Backstrom Family Ltd* Partnership v. Hallf '

*d

1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), this Court stated that under Rule 33,
Utah Rules < r Appellate Procedure,
wi"

e a s o n a u 1.1,-" Jeyall! r r I! d c l u a l

App. 40(a)."

Id. at 1160.

!..>*.:

frivolous appeal
is i l e l ,i iieij i iii U

is one
lit ruin n ' t .

Rule 40(a) states:

The signature of ai i attorney or a par ty
constitutes a certificate that the attorney or
the party has read the motion, brief, or other
paper; that to the best of the attorney's or
party's knowledge, information, and belief,
formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing
law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law; and that it is not interposed for any
improper purposes, such as to harass or cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the
cost of litigation.
Utah R. App. Pro. 40(a).

the purpose of delay.
should only

Moreover, "sanctions for frivolous appeals

applied

i mproper <

Rule 40(a) simply requires that an appeal

in egregious cases, lest

there be an

til: :i,e i: :l g l :i Il: to appea I
l err oneous .31 ower coi lr I:

decisions." Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 389 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
(emphasis added).
(Utah Li.
• •

'

See also Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 162

1989).
A * -.*••»
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this brief, C&Y Corporation's appeal is i* ell grounded in fact or
law and is
ni ni ii-in it-,1

.. : brought for the purpose ot delay

i iiuiine

appeal,
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The trxal court
mi n ' * u e s s ± t a t e d

A t: the very least, this certainly JLS not an egregious case

in which an appeal has no basis In fact or law.
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Accordingly, this

Court should deny General Biometries' claim for attorneys' fees and
costs pursuant to Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in C&Y Corporation's opening
brief, and for the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs/appellants
respectfully request that this Court:
1.

Reverse the trial court's determination that C&Y

Corporation's offer of $500,000 cash to purchase the MRC Division,
with $400,000 cash down and the remainder within 120 days, did not
constitute a cash offer, and rule as a matter of law that C&Y
Corporation's offer was a cash offer;
2.

Reverse the trial court' s determination that Gephart

did not have the apparent authority to enter the subject contract,
and direct the trial court to enter its conclusion of law that
Gephart did have the apparent authority to bind General Biometrics
to the subject contract for the purchase and sale of the MRC
Division;
3.

Reverse the trial court's determination that the

agreement between the parties was not sufficiently definite to
constitute a contract, and direct the trial court to enter its
conclusion of law that the parties had agreed to the essential
terms

and

that

the

agreement

was

sufficiently

definite

to

constitute a contract;
4.

Set aside the trial court's judgment and remand the

case for a new trial if the Court does not find that Gephart had
the apparent authority to enter the subject contract;
5.

Affirm the trial court's finding of fact that

neither Robert Condie nor James Yarter breached any duty which they
24

may have owed to General Biometrics;
6.

-Deny GeneiaJ

BlomeL

ies

under Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 11th day of October 1994.
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Tab A

Rule

D a m a g e s for d e l a y < 11 111 v 1111i1 m • i A \ i111 . m I H I I» I i > i \
of a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s .
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of
right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34,
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion,
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
(c) Procedures.
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its
own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of
the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of
the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other
paper.
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court
shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show
cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause
shall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and
permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for
good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of
oral argument.
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the
court shall grant a hearing.
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 33 is
substantially redrafted to provide definitions
and procedures for assessing penalties for delays and frivolous appeals.
If an appeal is found to be frivolous, the court
must award damages. This is in keeping with
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, the amount of damages — single or
double costs or attorney fees or both — is left to
the discretion of the court. Rule 33 is amended
to make express the authority of the court to

impose sanctions upon the party or upon counsel for the party. This rule does not apply to a
first appeal of right in a criminal case to avoid
the conflict created for appointed counsel by
Anders v. California. 386 US 738 (1967) and
State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981?.
Under the law of these cases, appointed counsel must file an appeal and brief if requested by
the defendant, and the court must find the appeal to be frivolous in order to dismiss the appeal.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Frivolous appeal.
—Defined.
—Sanctions.
Cited.
Frivolous appeal.
A husband's appeal from a judgment relating to alimony and distribution of marital
property was frivolous, where there was no basis for the argument presented and the evidence and law was mischaracterized and misstated. Eames v Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah
1987).
Plaintiff's counsel violated rule and was
therefore subject to sanction when, after he investigated
plaintiff's
malpractice
action
against defendant orthodontist and found that
he could not prove breach of duty or causation,

the record was devoid of any relevant, admissible evidence showing negligence, and after losing on summary judgment, he persisted in filing an appeal. Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 41-1
(Utan 1990).
An appeal brought from an action that was
properly determined to be in bad faith is necessarily frivolous under this rule. Utah Dep't of
Social Servs v. Adams. 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991).
—Defined.
For purposes of this rule, a frivolous" appeal
is one having no reasonable legal or factual
basis. Lack of good faith is not required.
O'Brien v. Rush. 744 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).
A frivolous appeal is one without reasonable
legal or factual basis. Backstrom Family Ltd.
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(c) Minute book. The clerk may keep a minute book, in which shall be
entered a record of the daily proceedings of the court. The clerk shall prepare,
under the direction of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or the Presiding
Judge of the Court of Appeals, a calendar of cases awaiting argument. In
placing cases on the calendar for argument, the clerk shall give preference to
appeals in accordance with the priority of cases provided in Rule 29.
(d) Notice of orders. Immediately upon the entry of an order or decision,
the clerk shall serve a notice of entry by mail upon each party to the proceeding, together with a copy of any opinion respecting the order or decision.
Service on a party represented by counsel shall be made upon counsel.
(e) Custody of records and papers. The clerk shall have custody of the
records and papers of the court. The clerk shall not permit any original record
or paper to be removed from the court, except as authorized by these rules or
the orders or instructions of the court. Original papers transmitted as the
record on appeal or review shall upon disposition of the case be returned to the
court or agency from which they were received. The clerk shall preserve copies
of briefs and attachments, as well as other printed papers filed.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective October 1, 1992, added the Sub-

division (c) designation and heading and redesignated the following subdivisions accordingly.

Rule 40. Attorney's or party's certificate; sanctions and
discipline.
(a) Attorney's or party's certificate. Every motion, brief, and other paper
of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney
of record who is an active member in good standing of the Bar of this state.
The attorney shall sign his or her individual name and give his or her business address, telephone number, and Utah State Bar number. A party who is
not represented by an attorney shall sign any motion, brief, or other paper
and state the party's address and telephone number. Except when otherwise
specifically provided by rule or statute, motions, briefs, or other papers need
not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an attorney or
party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party has read the motion,
brief, or other paper; that to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and
belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is not frivolous or interposed for the
purpose of delay as defined in Rule 33. If a motion, brief, or other paper is not
signed as required by this rule, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly
after the omission is called to the attention of the attorney or party. If a
motion, brief, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the authority
and the procedures of the court provided by Rule 33 shall apply.
(b) Sanctions and discipline of attorneys and parties. The court may,
after reasonable notice and an opportunity to show cause to the contrary, and
upon hearing, if requested, take appropriate action against any attorney or
person who practices before it for inadequate representation of a client, conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar or a person allowed to appear before the
court, or for failure to comply with these rules or order of the court. Any action
to suspend or disbar a member of the Utah State Bar shall be referred to the
Ethics and Discipline Committee of the State Bar for proceedings in accordance with the Rules of Discipline of the State Bar.
(c) Rule does not affect contempt power. This rule shall not be construed to limit or impair the court's inherent and statutory contempt powers.
(d) Appearance of counsel pro hac vice. An attorney who is licensed to
practice before the bar of another state or a foreign country but who is not a
member of the Bar of this state, may appear, upon motion, pro hac vice. Such
attorney shall associate with an active member in good standing of the Bar of
this state and shall be subject to the provisions of this rule and all other rules
of appellate procedure.

TabB

MICROBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH CORPORATION
BALANCE SHEET
September 30, 1990
ASSETS
urrent Assets
Cash in Bank/ChecJcing/Utah
Petty Cash

3,783
150
3,933

Total Cash
Accounts Receivable
Allowance for Bad Debt

134,442
(2,000)
132,442

Total Receivables
Prepaid Rent
Other Prepaid Expense
Total Prepaid Expenses
Raw Materials
Work in Process
Finished Goods

2,825
616
3,441
46,195
3,767
53,734

Inventory

103,696

Total Current Assets

243,512

,-operty and Equipment
Furniture and Fixtures
Laboratory Equipment
Leasehold Improvements
Autos

39,523
158,922
2,558
8,840

Total Property & Equipment
Accum
Accum
Accum
Accum

Deprec/Furniture/Fixture
Deprec/Lab Equipment
Deprec/Leasehold Imprvmt
Deprec/Autos

Total Accumulated Depreciation
Net Fixed Assets
•her Assets
Deposits
TOTAL ASSETS

209,843
(32,887)
(128,319)
(497)
•(8,840)
(170,543)
39,301

298

MICROBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH CORPORATION
BALANCE SHEET
September 30, 1990

LIABILITIES AND EQUITY
rrrent Liabilities
Accounts Payable
IntraCompany Payable
Accrued Vacation Pay
Total Accrued Eaployee Expense
Accrued Sales & Use Tax - UT
Current Portion Capital Lease
Current Portion Long Term Debt
Total Current Liabilities

$

26,858
(267,464)

7,419
7,419
107
186
2,201
(230,693)

ng Term Liabilities
ockholder Equity
Current Earnings
Net Stockholder Equity

513,804
513,804

TOTAL LIABILITIES AND EQUITY

283

GB0996

MICROBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH CORPORATION
INCOME STATEMENT
September 30, 1990
and for the Thirteen periods ended September 30, 1990
YR TO DATE
Sales
Product Returns
Discounts/Allowances

1,188,124
0
(117,671)

Net Sales

1,070,453

Replacements
Standard Materials
Standard Labor
Standard Overhead
Cost of Sales at Standard
Gross Margin at Standard
Material Usage Variance
Labor Efficiency Variance
Mfg. Spending Variance
Production Volume Variance
Total Manufacturing Variances
Gross Profit

(8,747)
(70,682)
(112,893)
(262,096)
(445,671)
616,036
(14,707)
14,078
10,138
68,531
78,040
694,076

Sales Expense
Marketing Expense
Administrative Expense:
Finance Expense:
Research & Development Costs:

0
(18,733)
(123,830)
(36,849)
0

Total Operating Expense:

(179,413)

Operating Profit/ (Loss)

514,663

Other Income/Expense

(859)

Net Income/Loss Before Taxes

513,804

NET INCOME/LOSS

513,804

7
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MICROBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH CORPORATION
INCOME STATEMENT
and for the Thirteen periods ended September 30, 1990
YR TO DATE
ANCE / CONTROL
QUALITY ASSURANCE
22,635
Payroll/IFA Indirect
toyroll Tax/IFA Indirect
ct
1 908
tefcl. Beneflta/IFA Indirect
Indir
812
CFA Outside Services
270
8
159
132
ons
[FA QC
QC SVipp
supplies
tlth
21,519
Allocations In/Out
(47,434)
Quality Control/Assurance Cost

m
v>
o
4>

BUDGET
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

VARIANCE
22,635
1 908
812
270
159
132
21,519
(47,434)

0

MICROBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH CORPORATION
INCOMB STATEMENT
September 30, 1990
and for the Thirteen periods ended September 30, 1990
YR TO DATE
BUDGET
MARKETING
Oil
4,627
0
Oil Tax
917
0
©yea Benefits
225
o
lisions,
7,011
o
tage/Deliyery
'285
0
•pKohe/Teiefax
1,041
0
reciatlon
102
o
_ _cellaneoue
250
8,400
Seaples
4^274
0_
Marketing Expense
18,733
8,400

I

o
o>
»-•
o
o
o

VARIANCE
4,627
917
225
7,011
285
1,041
102
(8,150)
4i274
10,333

MICROBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH CORPORATION
INCOME STATEMENT
September 30, 1990
and for the Thirteen periods ended September 30, 1990
YR TO DATE
BUDGET
ADMINISTRATIVE
65,404
71,200
Tax
.
5,439
7,120
oyee Benefits
3,180
5,040
uter Supplies
113
o
age/Auto
0
360
•/Other
24
o
quipment
ftEquip Rental
0
526
duipment Repair/Maintenance
0
1,200
aintenanca/Buildlng/Grounda
0
600
ffioe Supplies
21
3,600
Rent
.
0
7 656
~ aephpne/Telex/Telef oic
217
2,040
duties
'
0
i;920
JucationftEd. Materials
35
0
'axes/Property
304
0
jepreciatlon
245
1,920
Miscellaneous
440
3,600

VARIANCE

H

g
g

mm:"**"
Rations In/Out

istrative Expense;

en

a
a

in
48,ooo

123,830

8

48,000

154,784

24
(528,
(i:200

Uoo

k3 , 5 7 9

7,656
1 823
1 920
35
304
1,675)
3 160)
122
288

0

(30^9547

rroll

MICROBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH CORPORATION
INCOME STATEMENT
September 30, 1990
and for the Thirteen periods ended September 30, 1990
YR TO DATE
BUDGET
FINANCE
31,485
33,450

rroll Tax

.

iloyee Benefits
:slie Services ,
uter Repair/Maintenance

f

uter Supplies
paent & Equip.Rental
itenance/Biliiaing/Grounda
Lee supplies
rwocage/Delivery
7 1 010

siSf^ss ^ *^ ^
SSrJoh?!o;

ttXftfl/UCen8efl

'Late Fees
finance Expenses

CD
CD

•-»
O
O

2.665

3,345

103
0
0
885
616
30

0
528
264
900
660

(753)
132
90

!

960
o
0

?:

VARIANCE
(1.965)
7680)

(1,713
132
90

103
(528)
(264)
(15
J44J

111 ft'iin I

1,24"?

1,24?

28

0

36,849

48,519

,

Ml
28

(11,670)

MICROBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH CORPORATION
INCOME STATEMENT
September 30, 1990
and for the Thirteen periods ended September 30, 1990
YR TO DATE
BUDGET
OTHER INCOME/EXPENSE
Interest Expense

Other Income/Expense

VARIANCE

859

0

859

(859)

0

859

